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Triggering the Right to Counsel:
“Detention” and
Section 10 of the Charter
Steven Penney*

I. INTRODUCTION
Section 10(b) is one of the most important ― and most frequently
litigated ― legal rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1
Its language is deceptively simple: “[e]veryone has the right on arrest or
detention . . . to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be
informed of that right . . .”. From this single sentence, the Supreme
Court of Canada has over the past 25 years constructed an elaborate
regulatory scheme that, broadly speaking, requires police to provide
suspects with: (i) detailed, practical information about their rights and how
they can effectively exercise them; and (ii) a reasonable opportunity to
talk to a lawyer, should they express a desire to do so.2 Police are not
required to do any of these things, however, for suspects who have not been
either arrested or detained. It is thus crucial for police and courts to have
clear and sensible understanding of the meaning of arrest and detention.
Arrest is almost always straightforward. In the vast majority of cases,
it will be obvious whether a person is arrested.3 Arrestees, moreover,
must always be afforded the right to counsel. Unfortunately, the issue of
detention is not nearly as simple. The reason for this is twofold. First,
the courts have defined detention in a highly variable fashion. As
discussed in detail below, individuals may in some cases be detained
*

Faculty of Law, University of Alberta.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”].
2
See Steven Penney, “What’s Wrong with Self-Incrimination? The Wayward Path of
Self-Incrimination Law in the Post-Charter Era ― Part II: Self-Incrimination in Police Investigations”
(2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 280, at 307-11.
3
See, generally, R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217, at paras. 24-25
(S.C.C.); R. v. Whitfield, [1969] S.C.J. No. 66, [1970] S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.); James Stribopoulos,
“Unchecked Power: The Constitutional Regulation of Arrest Reconsidered” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 225,
at 230-32.
1
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even though they are neither physically restrained nor legally obliged to
cooperate with the authorities. In other situations, conversely, persons
may not be detained despite the fact that their liberty is obviously
restrained or they are involuntarily subjected to questioning or searches.
Second, courts have recognized a number of situations where detainees
may be denied their right to counsel under section 10(b). As we will see,
this has been accomplished either by interpreting the right restrictively
or by justifying its infringement under section 1 of the Charter.
For the most part, the courts are not to be blamed for this state of
affairs. Like most Charter provisions, section 10(b) is concise. It is not a
detailed regulatory code. It must nonetheless be interpreted and applied
in disparate circumstances. Courts have accordingly found creative ways
of reconciling its plain meaning with the exigencies of police questioning.
They can be criticized, however, for failing to provide good answers to
two important questions:
(1) In what circumstances does a detention arise when a suspect is neither
physically restrained nor under a legal duty to comply with police?
(2) Must police comply with section 10(b) in exercising their power of
investigative detention?
These failures stem, at least in part, from a reluctance to interpret
section 10(b) in light of the pragmatic realities of police questioning. For
the Supreme Court, the purpose of the right to counsel is to give criminal
suspects a fair opportunity to exercise their right to silence and refrain
from incriminating themselves. While this interpretation is intuitively
appealing (lawyers advise their clients to remain silent, after all), it is
largely misguided. Section 10(b)’s main purpose is to help deter abusive
interrogation practices, including those apt to produce false confessions.
If more attention were paid to his objective, it would be easier to craft
bright-line rules dictating when section 10(b) applies and when it does
not. This approach would also achieve a more optimal accommodation
between the police’s need to obtain reliable evidence and suspects’
interests in avoiding inhumane treatment and wrongful convictions.
This argument will proceed as follows: Part II details the Supreme
Court’s general approach to detention under section 10 of the Charter;
Part III further examines and critiques its interpretation of the purpose of
the right to counsel; Part IV looks at the case law on the three types of
detention (legal psychological restraint, non-legal psychological restraint
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and physical restraint) and makes suggestions for reform; and Part V
concludes.

II. THE GENERAL APPROACH TO DETENTION
The Supreme Court of Canada set out the general test for detention
under section 10 of the Charter very early on. In Therens,4 it considered
whether a driver required to participate in a roadside alcohol screening
test was detained within the meaning of section 10. 5 The Court had
previously held that such demands did not trigger a detention under
section 2(c)(ii) of the Canadian Bill of Rights,6 which provides the
“right to retain and instruct counsel without delay” to persons “arrested
or detained”.7 The fact that it is an offence to refuse to comply did not
mean that persons subject to the demand were legally detained.8 Detention,
the Court concluded, is limited to situations of “actual physical restraint”.9
This reasoning was rejected by Le Dain J. in Therens,10 who viewed
detention under section 10 of the Charter in much broader terms. In
addition to physical constraint, he asserted, a detention also arises when
police assume “control over the movement of a person by a demand or
direction which may have significant legal consequence and which
prevents or impedes access to counsel”.11 Though this would have been
enough to dispose of the appeal, Le Dain J. went a step further, holding
that a detention may sometimes arise even when there is neither physical
restraint nor “criminal liability for failure to comply” with a legal duty.12
He explained:
[I]t is not realistic, as a general rule, to regard compliance with a
demand or direction by a police officer as truly voluntary, in the sense
that the citizen feels that he or she has the choice to obey or not. . . .
4

R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.).
See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 254.
6
S.C. 1960, c. 44.
7
R. v. Chromiak, [1979] S.C.J. No. 116, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 471 (S.C.C.).
8
R. v. Chromiak, [1979] S.C.J. No. 116, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 471, at 478 (S.C.C.).
9
R. v. Chromiak, [1979] S.C.J. No. 116, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 471, at 478 (S.C.C.).
10
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.).
11
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 642 (S.C.C.), Le Dain J.,
dissenting (on other grounds). All eight judges in Therens agreed that the accused was detained,
however only three others expressly adopted Le Dain J.’s reasoning. Justice Le Dain’s approach in
Therens was endorsed by a unanimous court, however, in R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 649 (S.C.C.).
12
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 644 (S.C.C.).
5
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Most citizens are not aware of the precise legal limits of police authority.
Rather than risk the application of physical force or prosecution for
wilful obstruction, the reasonable person is likely to err on the side of
caution, assume lawful authority and comply with the demand. The
element of psychological compulsion, in the form of a reasonable
perception of suspension of freedom of choice, is enough to make the
restraint of liberty involuntary. Detention may be effected without the
application or threat of application of physical restraint if the person
concerned submits or acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty and
reasonably believes that the choice to do otherwise does not exist. 13

To summarize, a detention occurs when police either physically or
psychologically restrain suspects in situations where they might require
access to counsel.14 The category of psychological restraint may be further
subdivided into two types: (i) situations where suspects face legal liability
for refusing to comply with police directives; and (ii) situations where,
despite the absence of such liability, they reasonably believe that
compliance is mandatory.15 As discussed below, each of these types has
generated interpretive challenges. Before examining this doctrine, however,
it will be useful to further examine the purpose of the constitutional right
to counsel.

III. THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 10(b)
The Supreme Court of Canada’s understanding of the purpose of the
right to counsel in section 10(b) is best expressed as follows:
The purpose of the right . . . is to provide detainees with an
opportunity to be informed of their rights and obligations under the
law and, most importantly, to obtain advice on how to exercise those
rights and fulfil those obligations . . . . This opportunity is made
available because, when an individual is detained by state authorities,
he or she is put in a position of disadvantage relative to the state. Not
only has this person suffered a deprivation of liberty, but also this
person may be at risk of incriminating him- or herself. Accordingly, a
person who is “detained” within the meaning of s. 10 of the Charter is
in immediate need of legal advice in order to protect his or her right
13

R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 644 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 641-42 (S.C.C.), Le Dain J.,
dissenting; R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 648-49 (S.C.C.).
15
See R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 642-44 (S.C.C.),
Le Dain J., dissenting; R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 649 (S.C.C.).
14
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against self-incrimination and to assist him or her in regaining his or
her liberty. . . . [T]he right to counsel . . . is designed to ensure that
persons who are arrested or detained are treated fairly in the criminal
process.16

This statement is fine as far as it goes. Like its progenitor ― the
Miranda17 warning ― section 10(b) of the Charter does help to prevent
self-incrimination and mitigate the disadvantage that suspects face in
confrontations with police. But neither Miranda nor section 10(b) forbid
self-incrimination; nor do they prohibit police from pressuring suspects
to speak.18 Section 10(b) requires that detainees be informed of their
rights; it does not demand that they talk to a lawyer.19 Indeed, detainees
very frequently decline the opportunity to talk to a lawyer, and many
(irrationally) choose to make incriminating statements.20 The Supreme
Court of Canada has held that they are free to do so as long as they
demonstrate a “limited cognitive capacity to understand the process and
communicate with counsel”.21 Suspects need not be capable of exercising
“analytical reasoning” or making a decision that “best serves [their]
interests”.22
Detainees who invoke their right to counsel, moreover, need only be
given a “reasonable opportunity” to do so.23 There is no requirement that
they actually talk to a lawyer. And once detainees have been given this
opportunity, police are permitted to convince detainees to disregard their
lawyer’s advice, so long as they are not unduly persistent and do not
denigrate the integrity of counsel.24
16

R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, at 191 (S.C.C.).
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 444 (1966) (a person subject to custodial
interrogation must be warned “that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed”).
18
See Steven Penney, “What’s Wrong with Self-Incrimination? The Wayward Path of
Self-Incrimination Law in the Post-Charter Era — Part II: Self-Incrimination in Police Investigations”
(2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 280; Steven Penney, “Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View”
(1998) 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 309.
19
See R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233 (S.C.C.).
20
See Joseph R. Grano, “Introduction ― The Changed and Changing World of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure: The Contribution of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Policy”
(1989) 22 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 395, at 406-408; Louis Michael Seidman, “Rubashov’s Question:
Self-Incrimination and the Problem of Coerced Preferences” (1990) 2 Yale J.L. & Human. 149, at 165.
21
R. v. Whittle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 69, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, at 933 (S.C.C.).
22
R. v. Whittle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 69, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, at 933-34, 941-42 (S.C.C.).
23
R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233 (S.C.C.).
24
See R. v. Burlingham, [1995] S.C.J. No. 39, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206, at para. 13 (S.C.C.);
R. v. Gormley, [1999] P.E.I.J. No. 80, 140 C.C.C. (3d) 110 (P.E.I.S.C.(A.D.)) (police permitted to
17
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The limited protection offered by section 10(b) against selfincrimination can be seen even more plainly in the Supreme Court’s
approach to the compulsory taking of bodily substances. The Court has
maintained that such takings involve self-incrimination,25 and held that
police must comply with section 10(b) before obtaining samples to use
as evidence at trial.26 So long as police comply with the sampling power’s
procedural requirements, however, suspects have no right to refuse to
cooperate. Giving them a right to talk to a lawyer thus does very little to
prevent self-incrimination.
If section 10’s effect in preventing self-incrimination is so limited,
what is its point? The answer is buried beneath the Court’s cryptic reference
in Bartle27 to ensuring “fair treatment” and rectifying the “disadvantage”
that suspects face vis-à-vis police.28 As with the Miranda29 rule, section
10’s main purpose is to deter investigative techniques that are either
inherently abusive or apt to produce false confessions.30 Police are most
likely to use such methods against suspects who are reluctant to speak.
The section 10(b) caution proclaims or reinforces the notion (in the
minds of both suspects and police) that suspects are not required to
cooperate with police.31

question suspect for almost four hours despite suspect repeatedly refusing to answer questions on
the basis that his lawyer told him to remain silent); R. v. Roper, [1997] O.J. No. 305, 98 O.A.C. 225
(Ont. C.A.) (police permitted to continue questioning of suspect after he consulted counsel and
counsel advised police that the suspect intended to exercise his right to silence); R. v. Kerr, [2000]
B.C.J. No. 611, 32 C.R. (5th) 359 (B.C.C.A.) (same); R. v. Mayo, [1999] O.J. No. 714, 133 C.C.C.
(3d) 168 (Ont. C.A.) (police permitted to question suspect after he had talked to a lawyer despite his
insistence that he did not want to talk in absence of counsel); R. v. Ekman, [2000] B.C.J. No. 1363,
146 C.C.C. (3d) 346 (B.C.C.A.) (same); R. v. Friesen, [1995] A.J. No. 770, 101 C.C.C. (3d) 167
(Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal denied, [1995] S.C.C.A. No. 539 (S.C.C.) (police permitted to question
accused after he had talked to a lawyer); R. v. Russell, [1998] A.J. No. 569, 62 Alta. L.R. (3d) 87
(Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 363 (S.C.C.) (same); R. v. Plata, [1999]
J.Q. no 586, 136 C.C.C. (3d) 436 (Que. C.A.) (same). See also R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48,
2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.) (no violation of s. 7 right to silence when police continued questioning
despite accused asserting 18 times that he did not wish to speak).
25
See R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, at paras. 80-89 (S.C.C.).
26
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.).
27
R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 (S.C.C.).
28
R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, at 191 (S.C.C).
29
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30
See Steven Penney, “What’s Wrong with Self-Incrimination? The Wayward Path of
Self-Incrimination Law in the Post-Charter Era — Part II: Self-Incrimination in Police Investigations”
(2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 280, at 312-21.
31
See Richard Leo, “The Impact of Miranda Revisited” (1996) 86 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 621, at 679.
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By setting out bright-line rules for police, section 10(b) also avoids
the ambiguity inherent in the voluntary confession rule, which is the
other chief limitation on official questioning. If a suspect can show that
police did not issue a proper caution or did not comply with a request to
talk to a lawyer, any ensuing confession will likely be excluded whether
or not there is evidence of actual coercion. Section 10 therefore reduces
the likelihood that police will employ abusive tactics to induce confessions
from contumacious suspects.32 In the course of examining the jurisprudence
on the three categories of section 10 detention (legal psychological restraint,
non-legal psychological restraint and physical restraint), I make suggestions
for reform to better achieve this objective.

IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S DETENTION JURISPRUDENCE
1. Legal Psychological Restraint
The Supreme Court concluded in Therens33 and Thomsen34 that
drivers subjected to breath sample demands are detained within the
meaning of section 10 of the Charter. The Court later held that a detention
occurs when vehicles are stopped for any purpose.35 It has also found,
however, that police need not comply with section 10(b) in exercising
powers to briefly detain motorists to investigate driving-related offences.
Specifically, the right to counsel may be denied to drivers subject to
breath alcohol screening demands,36 asked questions about their alcohol
32
This is not to say that the Supreme Court’s s. 10(b) doctrine does as much as it could to
achieve this objective. See Steven Penney, “What’s Wrong with Self-Incrimination? The Wayward
Path of Self-Incrimination Law in the Post-Charter Era — Part II: Self-Incrimination in Police
Investigations” (2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 280, at 312-21.
33
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.).
34
R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C).
35
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 31 (S.C.C.).
See also R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.) (stopping of vehicles a
detention within the meaning of s. 9 of the Charter); R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC
32, at para. 66 (S.C.C.), Binnie J., concurring (same). These detentions presumably fall under the
“legal psychological” category as provincial highway traffic statutes typically make it an offence for a
driver to fail to stop when directed to do so by police. See, e.g., Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000,
c. T-6, ss. 157 and 166; Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, s. 216.
36
R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 650-56 (S.C.C.). Section 254(2)
of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 permits police, on the basis of reasonable suspicion, to
demand that a motorist provide a sample of breath for analysis by an approved screening device
(“ASD”). To be legally effective and constitutionally sound, this demand must generally be made
immediately, i.e., before there is a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel. A positive result does
not prove liability, but will typically give police the reasonable and probable grounds they require
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consumption37 or asked to perform physical sobriety tests. 38 Such
limitations on the right to counsel are justified under section 1 of the
Charter.
To justify a prima facie infringement of a Charter right, the Crown
must show that the limitation is both “prescribed by law” and “reasonable
. . . in a free and democratic society”. It will be prescribed by law if it
“is expressly provided for by statute”, arises by “necessary implication
from the terms of a statute or from its operating requirements” or results
from the “application of a common law rule”.39 In Thomsen,40 the Court
held that denying the right to counsel during roadside alcohol screening
tests is both “prescribed by law” (because the denial arises by necessary
implication from the Criminal Code’s41 alcohol testing regime) and
“reasonable” (because conferring a right to counsel at this stage would
unduly diminish the deterrence of impaired driving).42 For the same
reasons, the denial of the right to counsel to drivers questioned about
their alcohol consumption or asked to perform physical sobriety tests
was upheld in Orbanski; Elias.43
These cases raise questions about reading in limits to the right to
counsel that are not expressly set out in legislation.44 But the underlying
policy question should not be controversial. Had the Court held in
to demand a breathalyzer sample, which precisely determines the alcohol concentration in a person’s
blood. See Criminal Code, s. 254(3); R. v. Woods, [2005] S.C.J. No. 42, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 205, at paras.
13-15, 30-32, 43-44 (S.C.C.); R. v. Latour, [1997] O.J. No. 2445, 116 C.C.C. (3d) 279 (Ont. C.A.).
37
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 54-60 (S.C.C.).
Police do not have the power to compel motorists to answer questions or perform sobriety tests.
They must therefore seek motorists’ voluntary cooperation. However, as mentioned in footnote 35,
they do have the power to stop motorists to seek their cooperation, and this stopping power is a
form of legal psychological detention.
38
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). See also
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) does not
apply to motorists subject to brief roadside questioning as such questioning does not constitute
“custodial interrogation”).
39
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 645 (S.C.C.). See also
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 [RWDSU] v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.,
[1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, at 599 (S.C.C.) (Charter applies to the common law).
40
R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.).
41
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
42
R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 650-56 (S.C.C.). See also
R. v. Grant, [1991] S.C.J. No. 78, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 139 (S.C.C.).
43
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 54-60 (S.C.C.).
44
This issue was the focus of the debate between the majority and minority concurring
reasons in R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). See also
Tim Quigley, “Annotation: R. v. Orbanski” (2005) 29 C.R. (6th) 205; Don Stuart, Charter Justice
in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Carswell, 2005), at 303-304.
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Thomsen45 or Orbanski; Elias46 that the police’s failure to comply with
section 10(b) was not “prescribed by law”, the provinces would have
responded with legislation specifically authorizing the infringement, and
the courts would have found it to be a reasonable limitation under
section 1 of the Charter.47 The reason for this is simple: complying with
section 10(b) in these circumstances would prolong suspects’ detention
and frustrate the investigative process; yet it would do little to advance
the objectives of the right. In the case of ASD demands, so long as
police follow the rules, suspects must either provide a breath sample or
risk criminal punishment for refusing to do so. In the vast majority of
cases, talking to a lawyer does not alter this situation.
More importantly, providing a right to counsel at this point would
do little to deter abusive interrogation practices. Brief roadside questioning
is not likely to involve cruel interrogation methods or generate false
confessions.48 As the United States Supreme Court observed in Berkemer,49
the brevity and public nature of most traffic stops substantially mitigate
the risk of overreaching.
The situation is different for breathalyzer tests. These are usually
carried out at the police station and may involve a detention lasting
several hours. As with roadside screening tests, talking to a lawyer will
rarely prevent the compulsion of incriminating bodily substances. But
45

R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
47
In fact most provinces now have legislation that does specifically authorize police to
stop, detain, and conduct inquiries of motorists in the course of driving-related investigations. See,
e.g., Highway Traffic Act, C.C.S.M. c. H60, s. 76.1(1); Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8,
s. 48(1).
48
This is not to say that the courts have entirely ignored the issue of self-incrimination in
the context of roadside detentions. The Supreme Court suggested in R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias,
[2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 58-59 (S.C.C.), that, as a result of concerns over
compelled self-incrimination, the violation of s. 10(b) during roadside detentions might not be
justified if the Crown attempted to prove impairment by adducing evidence created by the accused,
such as the results of ASD tests and answers to questions about consumption. See also R. v. Milne,
[1996] O.J. No. 1728, 107 C.C.C. (3d) 118, at 121 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Coutts, [1999] O.J. No. 2013,
136 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at paras. 15-18 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C.
(3d) 27, at para. 61 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.). This
position is curious. If evidence created by drivers during roadside detentions is admissible for the
purpose of demonstrating the existence of reasonable and probable grounds (which it is), and such
grounds provide the basis for breathalyzer demands (the results of which are admissible), then this
evidence must be “self-incriminating” in any realistic sense of the phrase. It is thus difficult to
understand why evidence collected from drivers during roadside detentions should not be
admissible to prove impairment; or, putting the same point slightly differently, why s. 1 of the Charter
justifies denying the right to counsel when such evidence is admitted to establish grounds for the
breathalyzer demand on the voir dire but not when it is admitted to prove impairment at trial.
49
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, at 438-39 (1984).
46
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as in other custodial settings, the caution may help to deter abusive
questioning practices. Complying with section 10(b) in these circumstances,
moreover, is not likely to either substantially prolong the detention or
detract from the police’s ability to obtain reliable evidence of guilt. The
Therens50 Court thus rightly concluded that drivers subject to breathalyzer
demands must be informed of their right to counsel under s. 10(b).51
The Court has taken a different approach in the customs and
immigration context. Customs officials have broad powers to detain,
search and question people entering and leaving Canada.52 As in the case
of vehicle stops, failure to cooperate constitutes an offence.53 The Court
has found, however, that people subject to routine questioning and searches
at border crossings are not detained within the meaning of section 10(b).54
Detention arises only when people are suspected of having committed
an offence and subjected to lengthier and more intrusive inquiries.55
While this approach has been rightly criticized for stretching the
plain meaning of “detention” beyond its breaking point,56 the Court could
have reached the same result under section 1 of the Charter. As with
roadside detentions, there is little to be gained (and much to be lost) in
providing the right to counsel to people subject to preliminary, routine
inquiries at border crossings.

50

R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.). See also R. v.
Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 57 (S.C.C.) (“there is no
question that the motorist who is not allowed to continue on his way but, rather, is requested to
provide a breath or blood sample, is entitled to the full protection of the Charter right to counsel”).
See also R. v. Woods, [2005] S.C.J. No. 42, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 205, at paras. 35-36 (S.C.C.).
52
See Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), ss. 98, 99.1-99.3; Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 16.
53
See Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), s. 153.1; Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 127, 128.
54
See R. v. Simmons, [1988] S.C.J. No. 86, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495 (S.C.C.); R. v. Jacoy,
[1988] S.C.J. No. 83, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 548 (S.C.C.); Dehghani v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1993] S.C.J. No. 38, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Vandenbosch,
[2007] M.J. No. 346 (Man. C.A.) (applying customs detention jurisprudence to prison visitors).
55
See R. v. Simmons, [1988] S.C.J. No. 86, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495, at 521 (S.C.C.) (detention
arose when suspect strip searched); R. v. Jacoy, [1988] S.C.J. No. 83, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 548, at 557-58
(S.C.C.) (detention arose when decision made to strip search suspect if necessary).
56
See Eric Colvin & Tim Quigley, “Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure: The
1988-89 Term” (1990) 1 S.C.L.R (2d) 187, at 224-25; Tim Quigley, Procedure in Canadian
Criminal Law, 2d ed., looseleaf (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005) at § 5.3(c)(i).
51
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2. Non-legal Psychological Restraint
The second category of psychological detention ― situations where
people reasonably believe that they must cooperate with police ― is
more perplexing. In some circumstances people are “detained” under
section 10 even though their liberty is not limited by law. Despite their
(reasonable) belief that they must comply with police requests, in other
words, they have no legal obligation to do so. This situation almost always
arises in the context of police questioning. With few exceptions, while
police are free to question criminal suspects, suspects are not required to
answer.57
How have we arrived at this paradoxical situation? We can imagine
a legal regime that would clarify whether people approached by authorities
must cooperate. Before questioning, for example, police could be required
to tell people that they are either: (i) being detained under law for a
particular purpose (with an explanation as to what they are legally
obliged to do and what they are free to refuse to do); or (ii) not detained
under law and are free to refuse any requests.58 But for better or worse,
Parliament and the courts have sanctioned a much murkier regime. In
many situations, police may approach people and ask them questions
without informing them of their legal status.
Given this legal milieu, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court
has recognized that people often (reasonably but mistakenly) assume
that they must comply with police requests.59 Nor is it surprising, given
the imbalance of power and potential for abuse inhering in such situations,
that the Court has found that the protections of section 10 of the Charter
should be afforded to some suspects who are not actually “detained” in
the strict legal sense of the word. That said, it is neither necessary nor
desirable to caution all persons questioned by police.60 Unfortunately,
there is no obvious way to decide when section 10 should apply and when
57
See, generally, Ed Ratushny, Self-incrimination in the Canadian Criminal Process
(Toronto: Carswell, 1979), at 185-86.
58
See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Arrest (Report 29) at 20 (Ottawa: The
Commission, 1986); Stephen Coughlan, “Police Detention for Questioning: A Proposal” (1986)
28 Crim. L.Q. 64 and 170; Alan D. Gold, “Perspectives on Section 10(b): The Right to Counsel
under the Charter” (1993) 22 C.R. (4th) 370, at 374.
59
See R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.).
60
See R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 19 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Grafe, [1987] O.J. No. 796, 60 C.R. (3d) 242 (Ont. C.A.); United States of America v. Alfaro,
[1992] J.Q. no 831, 75 C.C.C. (3d) 211, at 236 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Elshaw, [1991] S.C.J. No. 68, [1991]
3 S.C.R. 24, at 53-70, L’Heureux-Dubé J., dissenting.
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it should not.61 The Supreme Court’s “reasonable belief” test provides
only limited guidance.
The lower courts have adopted a variety of approaches. For some,
detention under section 10 arises whenever police question a person
suspected of having committed a crime. 62 Others have asserted that
detention occurs only when this suspicion is “crystallized”, i.e., when
police intend to charge the suspect and conduct the interview to obtain
self-incriminating evidence.63 Most courts, however, have concluded
that no single factor is determinative. 64 On this approach, all of the
circumstances must be considered in deciding whether a suspect
reasonably concluded that cooperation with police was mandatory.65 The
leading case is the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Moran,66 where
Justice Martin set out the following list of relevant factors:
1.

The precise language used by the police officer in requesting the
person who subsequently becomes an accused to come to the police
station, and whether the accused was given a choice or expressed
a preference that the interview be conducted at the police station,
rather than at his or her home;

2.

whether the accused was escorted to the police station by a police
officer or came himself or herself in response to a police request;

3.

whether the accused left at the conclusion of the interview or
whether he or she was arrested;

4.

the stage of the investigation, that is, whether the questioning was
part of the general investigation of a crime or possible crime or
whether the police had already decided that a crime had been
committed and that the accused was the perpetrator or involved in

61
See, e.g., Gaudette c. R., [2006] J.Q. no 8112, 2006 QCCA 1004, at para. 35 (Que. C.A.);
R. v. Voss, [1989] O.J. No. 1124, 50 C.C.C. (3d) 58, at 73 (Ont. C.A.).
62
See R. v. Mickey, [1988] B.C.J. No. 2585, 46 C.C.C. (3d) 278 (B.C.C.A.).
63
See R. v. Hawkins, [1992] N.J. No. 174, 14 C.R. (4th) 286 (Nfld. C.A.), revd [1993]
S.C.J. No. 50, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.).
64
See R. v. Johns, [1998] O.J. No. 445, 14 C.R. (5th) 302, at para. 23 (Ont. C.A.); R. v.
Caputo, [1997] O.J. No. 857, 114 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 11 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. H. (C.R.), [2003] M.J. No. 90,
174 C.C.C. (3d) 67, at paras. 27-30 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Amyot, [1990] J.Q. no 1061, 58 C.C.C. (3d) 312
(Que. C.A.); R. v. V. (T.A.), [2001] A.J. No. 1679, 48 C.R. (5th) 366, at para. 18 (Alta. C.A.);
Gaudette c. R., [2006] J.Q. no 8112, 2006 QCCA 1004, at para. 37 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Ancelet,
[1986] A.J. No. 426, 70 A.R. 263 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. C. (S.), [1989] N.J. No. 81, 74 Nfld. & P.E.I.R.
252 (Nfld. C.A.).
65
See R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at 258-59 (Ont. C.A.), leave
to appeal refused [1988] 1 S.C.R. xi (S.C.C.).
66
R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.).
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its commission and the questioning was conducted for the purpose
of obtaining incriminating statements from the accused;
5.

whether the police had reasonable and probable grounds to believe
that the accused had committed the crime being investigated;

6.

the nature of the questions: whether they were questions of a general
nature designed to obtain information or whether the accused was
confronted with evidence pointing to his or her guilt;

7.

the subjective belief by an accused that he or she is detained,
although relevant, is not decisive, because the issue is whether he
or she reasonably believed that he or she was detained. Personal
circumstances relating to the accused, such as low intelligence,
emotional disturbance, youth and lack of sophistication are
circumstances to be considered in determining whether he had a
subjective belief that he was detained.67

Though the Supreme Court has yet to issue a detailed opinion on the
question, it appears to favour the Moran approach.68
This is unfortunate. Moran69 does not provide sufficient guidance
to police, who must often make quick decisions in pressure-filled
environments.70 There are too many factors to consider and no one factor is
determinative. Like other ex post facto, “totality of the circumstances”
tests, Moran is likely to produce too many errors. Fearing that a court
will later determine that a detention arose, police may issue the section
10 warning when it was not required. In some of these cases, evidence
that would have been acquired in the absence of the warning (such as a
confession) will not be discovered, potentially thwarting the conviction
of factually guilty suspects. Innocent suspects may also be detained for
an unnecessarily lengthy period of time and suffer the stigma and anxiety
associated with criminal accusation. In other cases, conversely, police
will incorrectly decide not to issue the caution. As a result, suspects may
67

R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at 258-59 (Ont. C.A.). Some courts
have held that another factor to consider is whether the police have made a clear and unequivocal
statement that the suspect is not under arrest or detention. See R. v. Rajaratnam, [2006] A.J. No. 1373,
at para. 14 (Alta. C.A.).
68
I glean this from the Court’s two-sentence, fact-based reversal of the Newfoundland
Court of Appeal in R. v. Hawkins, [1992] N.J. No. 147, 14 C.R. (4th) 55 (Nfld. C.A.), revd [1993]
S.C.J. No. 50, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.), and its equally unelaborated approval of the Ontario
Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Hicks, [1990] S.C.J. No. 7, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 120 (S.C.C.), affg
[1988] O.J. No. 957, 64 C.R. (3d) 68 (Ont. C.A.).
69
R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.).
70
See David M. Tanovich, “Elshaw ― Rethinking the Meaning of Detention: The Doctrine
of ‘Preliminary Investigatory Detention’ Is Not Appropriate” (1992) 7 C.R. (4th) 374, at 380.
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be subjected to abusive questioning, unreliable confessions may be
admitted (perhaps leading to the conviction of the factually innocent)
and reliable evidence may be excluded (perhaps leading to the acquittal
of the factually guilty).
Moran71 also trades too heavily on the concept of voluntariness. The
application of section 10 of the Charter should not turn on whether a
suspect (reasonably or unreasonably) believes that compliance with the
authorities is mandatory. It is likely that many people approached by
police and asked to answer a few general questions believe that they have
a legal obligation to (at least) stop and listen. As mentioned, it would be
counterproductive to warn such persons of the right to counsel. Conversely,
at least some people subjected to prolonged, intense questioning know
(without being told) that they are free to remain silent and walk away. As
discussed, however, issuing the section 10(b) caution in such circumstances
may help to minimize the potential for abuse and false confessions.72
The test for non-legal, psychological detention under section 10 should
thus accomplish two objectives. First, it should set out a bright-line,
ex ante rule telling police when they must comply with section 10.73
And second, it should ensure that the protections of section 10 are given
to people who really need them, while avoiding any undue burden on
police in conducting general investigative questioning.
These goals are best achieved by requiring compliance with section
10 only when police identify a suspect as a likely perpetrator and attempt
to elicit incriminating statements.74 It is these suspects who need the
protection that the right to counsel provides. Requiring police to warn
anyone they suspect of criminal activity, in contrast, casts the net too
wide. It could require police to caution anyone they remotely suspect of
71

R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.).
See Aman S. Patel, “Detention and Articulable Cause: Arbitrariness and Growing
Judicial Deference to Police Judgment (2001) 45 Crim. L.Q. 198, at 214-15.
73
Alan D. Gold, “Perspectives on Section 10(b): The Right to Counsel under the Charter”
(1993) 22 C.R. (4th) 370.
74
This is essentially the test proposed by the Newfoundland Court of Appeal in R. v. Hawkins,
[1992] N.J. No. 147, 14 C.R. (4th) 55 (Nfld. C.A.), revd [1993] S.C.J. No. 50, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 157
(S.C.C.). But I would omit from the test any reference to the intention of police to arrest or charge
suspects. Police may single out suspects as likely perpetrators without necessarily intending to arrest
them at that time. See also David M. Tanovich, “Elshaw — Rethinking the Meaning of Detention:
The Doctrine of ‘Preliminary Investigatory Detention’ is not Appropriate” (1992) 7 C.R. (4th) 374;
Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson
Carswell, 2005), at 326-27; Tim Quigley, Procedure in Canadian Criminal Law, 2d ed., looseleaf
(Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005- ), at § 5.3(c)(ii). The test proposed is also very similar to that used in
the United States to determine whether an interrogation is “custodial”, thus triggering the Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) right to counsel. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
72
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wrongdoing. This could prevent them from obtaining valuable information
and evidence when there is little danger of abuse.
The test I have proposed is far from perfect. It will sometimes be
difficult (for both police and courts) to decide whether someone is a
“likely perpetrator” or whether the main purpose of the inquiry is to
elicit incriminating evidence. While the subjective state of mind of both
the suspect and the police may be relevant, ultimately the question must
be approached objectively: would the reasonable observer conclude that
the questioning was akin to a “custodial interrogation”, i.e., questioning
designed to elicit incriminating statements from the likely perpetrator?75
Many of the factors listed in Moran76 will be germane to this inquiry.
But by focusing on the degree of suspicion attaching to the suspect and
the nature of the questioning, it should be easier to determine whether
the section 10 caution should be (or should have been) given.77 The test
should also do a better job than Moran of fulfilling the chief purposes of
section 10: preventing abusive interrogations and false confessions.
3. Physical Restraint
As noted in Therens78 and Thomsen,79 persons subject to any kind
of physical restraint are detained within the meaning of section 10 of
the Charter. In some situations, however, they may not be entitled to the
right to counsel under section 10(b). This issue typically arises in the
context of investigative detention. Drawing on the Ontario Court of
Appeal’s decision in Simpson,80 in Mann81 the Supreme Court of Canada
recognized a common law power to detain persons on the basis of
reasonable suspicion. This power allows police to briefly detain suspects
75
See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, at 323 (1994) (“the initial determination of
custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views
harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned”). Canadian courts have
correctly held that police telling a suspect that he or she is free to leave does not necessarily mean
that there was no detention within the meaning of s. 10. See R. v. Johns, [1998] O.J. No. 445,
14 C.R. (5th) 302, at para. 28 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Teske, [2005] O.J. No. 3759, at para. 55 (Ont. C.A.).
76
R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.).
77
Some appellate courts, while purporting to follow the “totality of the circumstances”
approach from R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.), have in fact
focused almost exclusively on the factors proposed above. See, e.g., R. v. Dolynchuk, [2004] M.J.
No. 135, 184 C.C.C. (3d) 214, at paras. 28-32 (Man. C.A.).
78
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.).
79
R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.).
80
R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 12 O.R. (3d) 182 (Ont. C.A.).
81
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.).
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for questioning and conduct pat-down searches for weapons. The Court
expressly declined to decide, however, whether persons subject to
investigative detention must be warned of their right to counsel.82
It must be stressed, however, that before there can be an investigative
detention there must be a detention. Following the Supreme Court’s
categorization scheme, an investigative detention can thus arise in only
three circumstances: (i) when police physically restrain a suspect
(e.g., by performing a frisk search83 or using force to prevent escape);
(ii) when there is legal liability for non-compliance (e.g., failing to heed
a police order to stop a vehicle); or (iii) when the test for non-legal
psychological restraint is met (i.e., where the suspect reasonably believes
that compliance is mandatory, or, as I have proposed, where police have
identified the suspect as the likely perpetrator and initiate questioning
with a view to eliciting incriminating statements). If none of these
circumstances is present, there is no detention (“investigative” or otherwise)
and police need not comply with any aspect of section 10 of the Charter.
If one of these circumstances is present, and the situation otherwise
fulfils the requirements of a lawful investigative detention, the question
becomes whether there is any reason to relieve the police of their usual
responsibility to comply with section 10(b). In the case of non-legal
psychological detention, the answer should be an emphatic “no”. Since
the test for this form of detention (however conceived) is designed
to single out situations in which the benefits of conferring the right to
counsel outweigh the costs, there can be no justification for failing to
issue and implement the section 10(b) caution. Indeed, as detailed below,
the kind of questioning triggering a finding of non-legal psychological
detention will usually be incompatible with the exercise of the investigative
detention power. Prolonged, custodial interrogations of persons identified
as likely perpetrators should be found to exceed the limits of investigative
detention, which is intended to be brief and relatively non-intrusive.
Questioning of this kind should proceed only under the auspices of

82
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 22 (S.C.C.). The Court
did confirm that police must comply with s. 10(a) of the Charter and inform suspects of the reason
for their detention. R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 21 (S.C.C.).
83
See R. v. Debot, [1989] S.C.J. No. 118, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, at 1146 (S.C.C.); R. v. V. (T.A.),
[2001] A.J. No. 1679, 48 C.R. (5th) 366, at para. 21 (Alta. C.A.); James Stribopoulos, “In Search of
Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1, at 28.
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voluntary cooperation84 or arrest. In either case, suspects should be
informed of their rights under section 10(b) of the Charter.
The circumstances are very different, however, for investigative
detentions based on physical or legal psychological restraint. In practice,
these types of detention usually arise when pedestrians are detained
during incidental searches or drivers are stopped for reasons other than
the investigation of motor vehicle offences.85 Since these intrusions
obviously constitute section 10 detentions, 86 one would have thought
that the question would be whether failing to afford the right to counsel
is justified under section 1 of the Charter. As in the roadside screening
and customs contexts, there is little danger of abuse or false confessions
when police question suspects in the course of a brief investigative
detention.87 The chief effect of affording the right to counsel in these
circumstances would be to prolong the length and intrusiveness of
detentions and diminish law enforcement effectiveness.88 It would thus
not be difficult to justify the denial of this right under section 1.
As yet there is a paucity of authority on this question.89 But in the
leading case, Suberu,90 the Ontario Court of Appeal surprisingly declined
84

By “voluntary” in this context I mean only that the police have no power to compel the
suspect to answer or even submit to questioning. I recognize (especially if the “reasonable belief
that compliance is mandatory” test is taken literally) that many suspects in this situation may
wrongly believe that they must cooperate with police.
85
Police stopping vehicles to investigate driving-related offences need not rely on the
investigative detention power as such stops may be made in the absence of individualized
suspicion. See R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.); R. v. Ladouceur,
[1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 (S.C.C.). The scope of such investigations must be
limited to driving-related inquiries, however. See R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 100, [1992]
3 S.C.R. 615 (S.C.C.). Any further detention for general investigative purposes would have to be
justified by at least reasonable suspicion.
86
See R. v. V. (T.A.), [2001] A.J. No. 1679, 48 C.R. (5th) 366, at para. 20 (Alta. C.A.). See
also R. v. Greaves, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1953, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 305 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused
[2007] S.C.C.A. No. 522 (S.C.C.).
87
See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, at 339-40 (1984).
88
See James Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment? Investigative Detention: Ten Years
Later” (2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 335, at 376-77; Lesley A. McCoy, “Liberty’s Last Stand? Tracing
the Limits of Investigative Detention” (2002) 46 Crim. L.Q. 319, at 327.
89
See R. v. Schrenk, [2007] M.J. No. 154, 2007 MBQB 93, at paras. 35-38 (Man. Q.B.)
(following the reasoning in R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27 (Ont. C.A.), leave to
appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.)); R. v. V. (T.A.), [2001] A.J. No. 1679, 48 C.R.
(5th) 366, at para. 32 (Alta. C.A.) (suggesting, without engaging in a s. 1 analysis, that s. 10(b) does not
apply to brief investigative detentions); R. v. Greaves, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1953, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 305,
at paras. 82-85 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 522 (S.C.C.) (raising but
not resolving question of whether brief investigative detention requires compliance with s. 10(b));
R. v. Campbell, [2003] M.J. No. 207, 175 C.C.C. (3d) 452, at paras. 44-52 (Man. C.A.) (police violated
s. 10(b) by failing to immediately warn a driver of his right to counsel during an investigative
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to consider section 1. Instead, Doherty J.A. held that the reference to
“without delay” in section 10(b) contemplated a “brief interlude” between
the initial investigative detention and the point at which police must
advise suspects of the right to counsel.91 During this period, police may
make “a quick assessment of the situation to decide whether anything
more than a brief detention of the individual may be warranted”.92
Justice Doherty elaborated as follows:
The police activity during the brief interlude contemplated by the
words “without delay” must be truly exploratory in that the officer
must be trying to decide whether anything beyond a brief detention of
the person will be necessary and justified. If the officer has already
made up his or her mind that the detained person will be detained for
something more than a brief interval, there is no justification for not
providing the individual with his or her right to counsel immediately. 93

On this view, investigation detentions may consist of two phases. In
the first, police have a brief opportunity to assess whether a further (less
brief) detention is warranted. During this period, the suspect’s right to
counsel is held in abeyance. If police decide that there is no basis to
continue the detention, the suspect must presumably be set free. If
continued detention is warranted, then before making further inquiries
police must warn the suspect of the right to counsel and facilitate access
to counsel if the right is invoked.
This is surely a strained reading of “without delay”.94 It will also
likely have unfortunate effects when applied by police on the ground.
Fearing that a court would later find that they overestimated the length
of the “brief interlude”, many police officers are likely to caution
suspects almost immediately after detention. This will prolong the
detention; no consideration of s. 1); R. v. Lewis, [1998] O.J. No. 376, 122 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.)
(police required to comply with s. 10(b) during investigative detention involving search of luggage).
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R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed
[2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.).
91
R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at para. 50 (Ont. C.A.), leave to
appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.).
92
R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at para. 50 (Ont. C.A.), leave to
appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.).
93
R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at para. 54 (Ont. C.A.), leave to
appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.).
94
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the s. 10 caution must be given immediately
after detention or arrest, unless it is necessary to first gain control over a dangerous situation. See
R. v. Strachan, [1988] S.C.J. No. 94, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980 (S.C.C.); R. v. Debot, [1989] S.C.J. No. 118,
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, at 1146, Lamer J. and 1163-64, Wilson J. (S.C.C.); R. v. Feeney, [1997]
S.C.J. No. 49, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, at para. 56 (S.C.C.).
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detention of the innocent and make it more difficult to obtain reliable,
incriminating evidence from the guilty. As the Supreme Court noted in
Mann95 (in a passage cited by Doherty J. in Suberu96), mandatory
compliance with section 10(b)’s requirements “cannot be transformed
into an excuse for prolonging, unduly and artificially, a detention that
. . . must be of brief duration”.97 The investigative detention power must
not, in other words, become “a de facto arrest”.98 The Court of Appeal’s
approach, however, would have precisely this effect.99 Further, it would
permit the prolonged detention of suspects on the basis of a standard
(reasonable suspicion) that is markedly lower than the grounds required
for arrest (reasonable and probable grounds).
The better approach is to justify the denial of the right to counsel for
the duration of investigative detentions under section 1 of the Charter.100
This will help to keep such detentions brief and allow police to conduct
95

R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal
allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.).
97
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 22 (S.C.C.); R. v. Suberu,
[2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at para. 50 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed [2007]
S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.).
98
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 35 (S.C.C.).
99
Justice Doherty (remarkably) appears to concede this in R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317,
218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at para. 54 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.)
(“If the officer has already made up his or her mind that the detained person will be detained for
something more than a brief interval, there is no justification for not providing the individual with his
or her right to counsel immediately . . . [I]n those cases, the investigative detention is a de facto arrest.”)
See also James Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment? Investigative Detention: Ten Years Later”
(2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 335, at 373-76 (noting the lack of guidance that courts have provided in
defining the maximum duration of investigative detentions).
100
As pointed out in James Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment? Investigative Detention:
Ten Years Later” (2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 335, at 378, it is unusual (and perhaps unseemly) for the
courts to uphold limitations on Charter rights that they themselves have imposed under the common
law. This may explain why the court went to such lengths to avoid a s. 1 analysis in R. v. Suberu,
[2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150
(S.C.C.). But as long as the courts are prepared to recognize new police powers, it seems inevitable
that some of them will have to be justified under s. 1 of the Charter. As noted, the Supreme Court
has held that common law rules are “prescribed by law” within the meaning of s. 1: R. v. Therens,
[1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 645 (S.C.C.). It has also upheld Charter-limiting
common law rules (including newly recognized ones) in other contexts: see British Columbia
Government Employees’ Union v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 76,
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 (S.C.C.) (upholding common law of criminal contempt); R. v. Daviault, [1994]
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it is in its frequent failure to subject common law Charter violations to the full analytical scrutiny of
the Oakes test (R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.)): see R. v. Clayton,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32 (S.C.C.), Binnie J., concurring.
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preliminary questioning in situations where the risk of abuse is low.
This does not mean, of course, that the right to counsel will never apply
to suspects who are not arrested. As discussed, when police identify a
person who was initially subject to investigative detention as the likely
perpetrator and initiate questioning with a view to eliciting incriminating
statements, they must comply with section 10(b) regardless of whether
or when they make an arrest.

V. CONCLUSION
The “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation, and especially
Charter interpretation, is now deeply entrenched in Canadian law. As a
result, the outcome of the interpretive enterprise often hinges on the
court’s characterization of the law’s objective. The main purpose of the
right to counsel in section 10(b) of the Charter, as the Supreme Court of
Canada sees it, is to protect criminal suspects against self-incrimination.
Informing detainees of their right to talk to a lawyer, the Court believes,
will help to prevent them from being unfairly taken advantage of by the
state’s powerful law enforcement machinery.
This interpretation of section 10(b) is largely mistaken. Informing
suspects of their right to counsel is a roundabout and often ineffectual
way of preventing self-incrimination. Section 10(b) is better understood,
like the Miranda101 rule that inspired it, as a prophylactic against abusive
interrogation methods (some of which are apt to produce false confessions
and wrongful convictions). It by no means serves as a guarantee against
these harms. But in concert with other prophylactics (such as the
confession rule), it can help to minimize them while still allowing police
a reasonable measure of access to reliable, self-incriminating evidence.
With these ends in mind, I have proposed two modest reforms to the
law on the application of section 10(b) of the Charter. First, the test for
non-legal psychological restraint should be simplified to find detention
only when police identify a suspect as the likely perpetrator and attempt
to elicit incriminating statements. As compared with the prevailing
“totality of the circumstances” approach, this test is easier for police to
understand ex ante, easier for courts to apply ex post, and achieves a
more optimal accommodation between the interests of suspects and law
enforcement. Second, the courts should clarify that, in the vast majority
of circumstances, police do not have to comply with section 10(b) at any
101
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point during an investigative detention (because the infringement of the
right to counsel is justified under section 1 of the Charter). At the same
time, they should confirm that investigative detentions must be brief and
limited to preliminary inquiries only.

